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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20020432-CA

v.
RICHARD R. HOPKINS,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appealfroma conviction of issuing a bad check, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999), in the Second Judicial District Court,
Davis County, Utah, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson presiding. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court should have adopted defendant's strict
interpretations of Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), in
determining defendant's guilt
Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] reviews for correctness a [lower]
court's statutory interpretation, according it no particular deference." State v. Singh, 819
P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted).

Issue No. 2: Whether the clear weight of the evidence, including defendant's
concession that his account balance was insufficient to cover the checks he issued,
supported the trial court's judgment beyond a reasonable doubt.
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the
evidence, [an appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against
the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the appellate court] otherwise reach[es] a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000
UT App 277, f4, 12 P.3d 108 (citations and quotations omitted).
Issue No. 3: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) is constitutionally sound in
its purpose and application.
Standard of Review: Where a constitutional challenge presents a question of law,
it is reviewed for correctness. State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, f 8,21 P.3d 212.
Issue No. 4: Whether defendant's claim that his disclosure to the victim that there
may be problems with check 172 was a complete defense for having issued checks 172
and 191 without sufficient funds.
Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] will not set aside a trial court's
findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous." Greenwood v. City of North
Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following are found in Addendum A.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-204 (1999);
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1999);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1999);
Utah R. App. P. 24;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 16..
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged by information with issuing a bad check or draft, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999). R. 1-2,17-18,66-67.
At the preliminary hearing, that charge was reduced to a third degree felony pursuant to
section 76-6-505(3)(c). See R. 63-64. After a bench trial, defendant was convicted as
charged. R. 140-41; 184:204-06. The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory
indeterminate prison term of zero to five years. R. 144-47; 185:15-16. That sentence was
suspended, however, and defendant was ordered to serve a statutory probationary term of
thirty-six months, pay $2,219.85 in restitution to the victim, and complete 200 hours of
community service. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R. 154-55.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS'
On 9 February 2001 and again on 26 February 2001, defendant, a seasoned
businessman and attorney and the president of Cornerstone Publishing & Distribution,
Inc. ("Cornerstone"), issued two paychecks totaling $2,127.85 to Julie Vanisi for services
rendered as an employee of Cornerstone, knowing that the company bank account had
insufficient funds to cover the checks. See R. 184:32-51,148-50, 154-55. The two

'The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See
Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ^2, 975 P.2d 501.
3

checks were subsequently dishonored by the bank and remain unpaid. See R. 184:98-99,
156.
* * *

In August 2000, acting as the president of Cornerstone, defendant purchased
Horizon Publishers and Distributors, Inc. ("Horizon")fromDwayne Crowther. R.
184:13-16,126-30,154. At that time, Horizon had at least nine employees, including
Julie Vanisi, each of whom became employees of Cornerstone after the sale. R. 184:20;
148. Julie's duties for Cornerstone included, assisting with accounts payable, accounts
receivable, and payroll. R- 184:21-22,54-57.2
On 8 September 2000, defendant set up a business checking account in
Cornerstone's name at U.S. Bank. R. 184:17-18,76-77,150. At that time, defendant was
made aware of the bank's fees for returned checks. R. 184:96. Defendant was the only
individual authorized to sign on the account. R. 184:150,162.
Defendant maintained an office on site and managed Cornerstone's business on a
daily basis. R. 184:17. When Cornerstone began generating revenue, defendant
personally tallied the checks received, prepared the deposit receipts, and deposited the
checks into the corporate checking account R. 184:55. Defendant also received the
account statements and performed the account reconciliation. R. 184:55,150-51,160-61.
Although Julie assisted in generating the payroll, defendant personally held the
2

Julie reported that she had a good working relationship with defendant. R.
184:23, 70-71. In fact, between September and October 2000, rather than have her leave
the company for a higher paying job, defendant gave Julie a raise in her hourly wages. R.
184:21,23,56.
4

company checkbook and would approve and sign the paychecks. R. 184:23,29. The pay
periods were scheduled on the 10th and 25th days of each month, or the work day before
if the payday fell on a weekend. R. 184:23. Usually, defendant would hand-deliver the
paychecks to his employees on paydays. R. 184: 29-30. The company did not use direct
deposit banking. R. 184:30.
In December 2000, Cornerstone began having financial difficulties. R. 184:13044,166. Bank statements reflected that the following number of checks failed to clear
Cornerstone's account: twenty-seven checks during December 2000, twenty-six during
January 2001, and forty-eight checks during February 2001. R. 184:87-88; State's
Exhibits 1,2, and 3. From December through February 2001, defendant made daily
telephone calls to the bank's automated telephone line to find out the account's current
balance. R. 184:152.
On 8 February 2001 the corporate checking account had an ending balance of
$28.56. R. 184:84; State's Exhibit 3. Despite the account balance, the next day
defendant signed and issued Julie a paycheck ("check 172") in the amount of $1,021.64.
R. 184:32-34; State's Exhibit 8.3 Defendant issued paychecks to the other employees that
same day. R. 184:60-62. When he handed check 172 to Julie, defendant asked her not to
cash it but to deposit it and "let it go through the system." R. 184:58, 61-62. Julie did as
defendant requested, and presented the check for deposit at her credit union that same
day. R. 184:34-36.
3

The record indicates that Cornerstone's account balance on 9 February 2001 was
$5.81. R. 184:84; State's Exhibit 3.
5

Seven days later, on 15 February, Julie received a telephone call from her credit
union informing her that check 172 had been refused by U.S. Bank for non-sufficient
funds. R. 184:35-36. She asked the credit union to hold the check until the next day and
then present it again. Id. On 16 February and again on 20 February Julie received
additional calls from her credit union indicating that further attempts to present check 172
to U.S. bank had failed. Id. At that point, Julie met with defendant and informed him of
the returned check. R. 184:36-38. Defendant told her that he would take care of it. R.
184:38.
On Friday, 23 February, Cornerstone's checking account had an ending balance of
$998.75. R. 184:84; State's Exhibit 3. Yet the following Monday, 26 February,
regardless of the fact that check 172 was still outstanding and that the current balance was
insufficient to cover another paycheck, defendant issued a paycheck ("check 191") to
Julie in the amount of $1,106.21. R. 184:85; State's Exhibit 4.4
The next day, rather than take check 191 to her credit union, Julie took it to U.S.
Bank. R. 184:46-47. Upon presentment, the teller refused the check and informed Julie
that Cornerstone's checking account contained insufficient funds to cover the check. R.
184:47. Julie went back to U.S. Bank on 28 February and was again informed that the
check would not clear. R. 184:48. At that time, a bank officer typed "Non Sufficient
Funds" on the face of check 191, dated it, stamped the bank's name and address on the
check, and returned it to Julie. R. 184:48-49; State's Exhibit 4.
4

The record indicates that Cornerstone's account balance on 26 February 2001 was
$170.89. R. 184:85; State's Exhibit 3.
6

At trial, defendant admitted that according to the ending balances listed on the
February bank statement, neither check 172 nor check 191 would have cleared
Cornerstone's checking account on any day during that month. R. 184:168-69. At the
end of February 2001, defendant terminated Julie's employment. R. 184:26. Several
months after issuing Julie's paychecks, defendant declared bankruptcy. R. 184:125.
Although defendant paid the other employee's outstanding paychecks prior to declaring
bankruptcy, both of Julie's checks remained unpaid R. 184:156,180-82; 185:1-2.
ARGUMENT SUMMARY
POINT I: Arguing that the trial court should have adopted his strict interpretation
of Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), defendant claims that the
trial court misinterpreted the statute. Under his interpretation of the statute, defendant
claims that he did not possess the requisite mens rea or act within the other elements of
the statute. Defendant fails, however, to show that his reading of the statute is in
harmony with its plain language and with legislative intent As opposed to the trial
court's interpretation, defendant's construction results in a nonsensical and unreasonable
reading of section 76-6-505(1) which runs contrary to the statute's clear legislative
purpose.
POINT Hi Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial was
insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly issued two bad
paychecks to the victim. That argument assumes that defendant's interpretation of the
statute is correct. However, under the trial court's correct interpretation of section 76-6-

7

505(1), defendant's claim fails. The clear weight of the evidence proves that defendant
knowingly issued more checks than there were funds in his account.
POINT III: Defendant next claims that section 76-6-505(1) is unconstitutional in
that it impermissibly punishes debtors and violates his due process rights. Because the
clear purpose of section 76-6-505(1) is to punish intentional overdrafts and not to
imprison debtors, defendant's claim fails, Additionally, given this Court's required
presumption against unconstitutionality, defendant's failure to adequately brief or
otherwise meet his heavy burden of proving unconstitutionality, and the clarity of section
76-6-505(1), defendant fails to show that the statute is unconstitutional.
POINT IV: Finally, defendant argues that he should have been given the benefit
of his alleged disclosure to the victim to hold her checks for a few days before cashing
them, as a complete defense to the charge. Not only is this claim inadequately briefed,
but the record refutes defendant's claim that his defense is absolute. The record shows
that defendant only offered that disclosure with regard to check 172. Even if the trial
court were to find that defendant's claim was valid with regard to check 172, he could
still have been convicted for issuing check 191. Therefore, defendant's alleged defense is
incomplete.
ARGUMENT
Defendant was charged by information under both subsections (1) and (2) of
Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505, which describe variants of the
offense of issuing a bad check or draft. See R. 1-2, 17-18, 66-67; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

8

505(1) and (2) (1999). After a bench trial, defendant was convicted as charged—under
both subsections of the statute. SeeR. 140-41; 184:204-06. The trial court issued
findings under subsection (1) and (2) in support of its judgment. See R. 184:204-06.
Based on the trial court's ruling, defendant's conviction may be upheld under subsection
(1) or (2) or both.5 For that reason, although defendant's arguments pertaining to section
76-6-505(2) lack merit, the State need only respond to defendant's claims under 76-6505(1) as found in Points I, II, and IV, and Point III subsections C and D of defendant's
brief.
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S INTERPRETATION OF UTAH'S BAD
CHECK STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1),
RUNS CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND
TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE
Defendant claims that in convicting him of issuing a bad check the trial court
incorrectly interpreted subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. See Br. of Aplt. at
20-21,28-31. That subsection provides:
Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money,
for the purpose of obtainingfromany person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad
check or draft.
5

Cf. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (as opposed to a bench
trial where findings are issued on each element, "a general jury verdict cannot stand if the
State's case was on more than one factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and
any one of those theories is flawed or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In such
circumstances it is impossible to determine whether the jury agreed unanimously on all of
the elements of a valid and evidentially supported theory of the elements of the crime.").
9

Utah Code Ann. 76-6-505(1) (1999).
Although scattered throughout his brief, defendant's statutory interpretation claim
is essentially threefold: (1) in Point I subsection C, defendant claims that the phrase
"knowing it will not be paid" should have been interpreted to include knowledge that a
specific check will not be paid, see Br. of Aplt. at 21-23; (2) in Point I subsections B and
D of his brief, defendant claims that the trial court should have interpreted the terms
"knowing"and "obtaining" to include dishonesty as an element of the crime, see Br. of
Aplt. at 20-21,23-25; and (3) in Point II subsections A and B, defendant claims that the
trial court misinterpreted the phrase "paying for any . . . wages" to be an alternative
element to "obtaining... a n y . . . thing of value," and that his conduct fell outside the
"obtaining" element, see Br. of Aplt at 25-31. Each of defendant's claims lack merit
When faced with an issue of statutory interpretation, "[an appellate court's]
primary obligation is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000
UT 56, f 25,4 P.3d 795. Accordingly, an appellate court presumes that the legislature
used each term of a statute advisedly, and only looks beyond the plain language if it is
ambiguous. State v. Chancy, 1999 UT App 309, <|22,989 P.2d 1091; Burns, 2000 UT 56,
125. 6
6

In Point I subsection A of his brief, defendant states that as a "rule of statutory
construction, the requirements of [Utah Code Ann] § 76-6-505(1)... must be liberally
construed in [his] favorf.]" Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, defendant cites no Utah law, and
the State is aware of none, in support of that proposition. Under Utah law, although this
Court must review the trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness, affording it no
deference, its "primary obligation is to give effect to the legislative intent as evidenced by
10

A.

Defendant's act of writing numerous checks on insufficient funds fails within
the legislative intent of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1).
In Point I subsection C of his brief, defendant claims that the trial court should

have strictly construed the phrase "knowing it will not be paid" in section 76-6-505(1) to
mean that he must have had knowledge that a "specific check" will not be honored by the
drawee at the time of issuance. Br. of Aplt. at 21-23,25. Essentially, defendant claims
that the act of writing as many checks as one wants based on future income while
knowing that some of the checks will not clear the account is not a criminal offense under
section 76-6-505(1). This interpretation leads to ludicrous results.
Section 76-6-505(1) reveals that the clear legislative purpose of the statute is to
prevent the negotiation and delivery of worthless instruments into commerce, or in other
words, to prevent intentional overdrafts. See State v. Berry, 358 So.2d 545, 545 (Fla.
1978) (purpose of bad check statute is to "ban[] the circulation of worthless commercial
paper because of the danger it poses to the flow of tradef.]"). The statute states that the
issuance of a bad check "knowing it will not be paid by the drawee" is a punishable
offense. Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-505(1) (1999). A person who acts "knowingly" is one
who "is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances," and who "is
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2103 (1999). Accordingly, the phrase "knowing it will not be paid by the drawee" clearly
refers to the payor's knowledge that any check may not be honored at issuance. See id.\
the [statute's] plain language." Burns, 2000 UT 56, % 25; State v. McGee, 2001 UT 69, «|
6,31 P.3d531.
11

see also State v. McHugh, 697 P.2d 466,469-71 (Mont 1985) (knowledge that some
checks may not clear an account clearly falls within the "knowing" element of Montana's
bad check statute, Mont Code Ann. § 45-6-316 (1985)).
Defendant's statutory interpretation runs contrary to the Legislature's purpose of
preventing overdrafts. See State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, f6,14 P.3d 114 ("It is a
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation... that a statute be looked at in its entirety
and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished/*) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Under defendant's interpretation, an individual who
does not have any form of check protection may write checks based future income rather
than actual funds. Also, one could legally write numerous checks knowing that there are
only sufficient funds in the checking account to cover a portion of those checks. That
reading of section 76-6-505(1) would encourage rather than prevent overdrafts.
In addition, under defendant's interpretation, the State would be required to prove
that defendant knew the exact time when the payee would present the check to the drawee
bank. Because such knowledge is privy only to the payee, such an element would be
impossible to prove. Accordingly, defendant's strict interpretation leads to an unfair
result which conflicts with the Legislature's general intent See Utah Code Ann. §76-1106 (1999) ("The rule that a penal statute? is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state . . . [rather, the
statutes] shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms[.]"); State v.
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Christensen, 2001 UT 14, f 5,20 P.3d 329 (strict construction rule not applicable to
criminal cases).
Moreover, defendant's interpretation nullifies any legal effect of section 76-6505(1). The only reasonable reading of section 76-6-505(1) is that one must have money
in his or her account or overdraft protection when the check is issued to avoid violating
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505( 1) (1999). In other words, if the payor
knows at the time of issuance that his account contains insufficient funds and yet
continues to write checks, the payor is in violation of section 76-6-505(1). See id. Under
defendant's interpretation, numerous overdrafts would not punishable, and the statute
would have no legal effect Accordingly, defendant's claim fails.
B.

In light of the Legislature's exclusion of "intent to defraud" as an element of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), defendant's claim that "dishonesty" is an
essential element is frivolous, and in any event, defendant's conduct was
dishonest
Next, in Point I subsections B and D of his brief, defendant argues that the terms

"knowing"and "obtaining" as found in section 76-6-505(1) should have been read to
require a showing of "dishonesty" as an essential element in issuing a bad check. Br. of
Aplt. at 20-21. Essentially, defendant claims that he cannot be convicted under section
76-6-505(1) because his conduct was not dishonest. See id. Defendant's claim is
frivolous.
State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), rebuts defendant's argument. In
Delmotte, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the Legislature specifically intended
that section 76-6-505(1) not require a showing of "intent to defraud." Id. at 1315; see
13

Black's Law Dictionary, 324 (6th ed. abr. 1995) (defining the term "dishonesty" as
"[disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud") (emphasis added). Instead, the Supreme
Court held that "[t]he element of 'knowledge' of the overdraft is now sufficient to support
a conviction." Delmotte, 665 P.2d at 1315.7 Accordingly, in light of Delmotte's rejection
of dishonesty orfraudas an element of section 76-6-505(1), defendant's claim clearly
fails.
In any event, defendant's conduct was dishonest Although defendant told Julie
that he would "take care of* or "cover" checks 172 and 191, he never did* See R. 184:38,
155-56. Instead, he terminated her employment and declared bankruptcy. R. 184:26,
125. However, prior to declaring bankruptcy, defendant paid the other employees who
complained of returned paychecks. SeeR. 148; 184:180-82. Only Julie's checks
remained unpaid See 184:156; 185:1*2. Despite having been the benefactor of Julie's
work-services performed between January and February 2001, defendant only offered to
pay any bank fees or costs that might have arisen as the result of issuing the bad checks.
See R. 185:1-2. Accordingly, the record reflects that defendant's conduct was dishonest.

7

Although defendant cites to Delmotte, he fails to offer any case analysis. See Br.
of Aplt. at 21. Instead, defendant relies on State v. Pfannenstiel, 448 P.2d 346 (Utah
1968), a case that predates significant amendments made to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6505(1) in 1977, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (1999), and several old cases from
other jurisdictions whose statutes require a showing of intent to defraud. See Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 21-3707 (2002) (requiring a showing of intent to defraud); State v. Parsons, 398
S.W.2d 283 (Tex Crim. App. 1966) (intent to defraud is an essential element of Texas'
bad check statute); State v. Stoveken, 229 N.W. 2d 224, 226 (Wis. 1975) (intent to
defraud is an element of Wisconsin's bad check statute). Accordingly, those cases have
no relevance to the present matter.
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C.

Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), the trial court
correctly found that defendant satisfied the "paying for a n y . . . wages"
element of the statute.
Finally, in Point II subsections A and B of his brief, defendant attacks the trial

court's findings, claiming that the court misinterpreted the statutory phrases "obtaining ..
• any . . . thing of value" and "paying for any . . . wages." Br. of Aplt. at 25-31.
Essentially, defendant claims the trial court should have applied the word "obtaining" as a
contemporaneous element. See Br. of Aplt. at 25-27. In other words, defendant argues
that his conduct fell outside section 76-6-505(1) because he had already received Julie's
work-services when he issued her paychecks, and therefore, he could not have
contemporaneously "obtained" anything at that time. See id. Additionally, defendant
claims that the phrase "or paying for any... wages" is not intended to define something
separatefroma "thing of value," and therefore, not an alternative to the "obtaining"
element. See id. Defendant's interpretation of section 76-6-505(1) is nonsensical and
runs contrary to legislative intent
At the bench trial, after hearing all the evidence and having carefully reviewed
section 76-6-505, the trial found that defendant issued Julie's paychecks. R. 184:204-05.
The court then made the following findings:
The purpose of each of the checks at issue was a purpose set out in
[76-6-505(1) and (2)]; that is, paying for wages, salary, labor. And with
regard to subsection [1], the issue is whether [defendant] knew it would not
be paid by the drawee. And as I review State's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the
bank statements that show numerous bounced checks in December, January
and February, as I review the testimony that—that numerous employees
were told that, you know, don't try to cash this. Just deposit it. we're
confident it will pass. That showed knowledge that there was a problem.
15

And I think it's sufficient to show knowledge that an given check may not
be paid by the drawee.

It's clear with regard to these two checks, they were refused by the
drawee and the defendant's conduct was knowing. It was also extremely
reckless with regard to the state of the business as testified to during the
time at issue, February of 2001. And I find that all of the elements of
subsection 1 of 76-6-505 have been shown by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
R. 184:205-06. Accordingly, the trial court found that defendant issued checks 172 and
191 in payment for Julie's wages. See id. This finding is consistent with the plain
language of section 76-6-505(1).
The relevant language of section 76-6-505(1) provides that "[a]ny person who
issues... a check... for the payment of money, for the purpose of obtainingfromany
person... any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for... wages,...
knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty
of issuing a bad check or draft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (1999). Under the trial
court's reading of the statute, one may issue a check for one of two purposes: "obtaining
. . . any . . . thing of value or paying for... wages." Id. (emphasis added).
Grammatically, that language can be read no other way. Defendant's interpretation
would omit the "or" before "paying for... wages," resulting in awkward and nonsensical
syntax. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1 53,463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ("'[n]o...
word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if the construction can be
found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.'") (citation
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omitted). The trial court's interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the
statute as a whole, whereas defendant's interpretation is not. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000
UT 55, fl7, 5 P.3d 616 ("The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute ...").
Additionally, defendant's claim that his conduct fell outside section 76-6-505(1)
because he had "obtained" Julie's work-services prior to issuing her paychecks, leads to a
result that is contrary to legislative intent. Section 76-6-505(1) expressly includes the
phrase "paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6505(1). Usually, wages and salary are paid out after an employee has completed two
work weeks. Accordingly, the phrase "paying for any . . . wages [or] salary" clearly
indicates the Legislature's intent to punish the act of knowingly issuing a bad paycheck
for prior services under section 76-6-505(1). See State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492,
493-94 (Utah App. 1993) (an appellate court "assumes 'the Legislature used each term
advisedly, and [] give[s] effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted
meaning'") (citation omitted). Thus, defendant's interpretation of section 76-6-505(1)
runs contrary to the legislative intent apparent within the language of the statute.8

8

In support of his argument, defendant compares section 76-6-505(1) to Utah Code
Ann. § 7-15-1 (Supp. 2002). Br. of Aplt. at 30-31. However, section 7-15-1 is a civil
statute, and therefore, is unhelpful in the instant case. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^
10, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (refusing to rely on a case based on a civil statute).
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POINT II
WHERE DEFENDANT NEGLECTS TO MARSHAL
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL AND THE
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE TRIAL EVIDENCE
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION,
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY
OF THE EVIDENCE FAILS
In Point I subsection C of his brief, defendant claims that under his interpretation
of section 76-6-505(1), the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to show his knowledge
that checks 172 and 191 would not clear Cornerstone's account. Br. of Aplt. 21-23.9 As
shown in Point I subsection A above, defendant's interpretation of section 76-6-505(1) is
incorrect. Accordingly, where defendant fails to marshal the evidence adduced at trial,
and in any event, the clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's judgment,
defendant's claim fails.
A.

Defendant fails to marshal the evidence.
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's judgement.

See Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all
record evidence that supports the challenged findings.").
In West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., this Court held that "the
marshaling concept does not reflect a desire merely to have pertinent excerptsfromthe
9

On appeal, defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect
to his knowledge that Julie's paychecks would not be honored by the bank. See Br. of
Aplt. At 21-23. Defendant does not argue that the other elements of section 76-6-505(1)
were not met. See id. In any event, the evidence adduced at trial clearly shows that
defendant issued a paycheck to Julie in payment for her wages, and that U.S. Bank
refused to offer payment on the checks. See R. 184:32-36, 48-49, 85, 98-99; State's
Exhibits 4 and 8.
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record readily available to a reviewing court." 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991).
Rather, the appellant must present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists." Id.
After gathering "this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret
out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id.
Here, the only facts marshaled by defendant in support of his claim consist of a
one-sentence statement: "[Defendant] knew the company was having problems with its
account, and warned the employees that they might experience problems so they should
deposit the checks to their own accounts and allow them to clear in the normal course of
banking." Br. of Aplt. at 22. That single statement reveals defendant's complete failure
to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the veryfindings[he] resists." Majestic Investment Co.,
818 P.2d at 1315. Accordingly, where defendant wholly fails to marshal the evidence
adduced at trial, his claim fails.
B.

The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's decision.
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to marshal the evidence adduced at trial, the

clear weight of the evidence reveals that upon issuing checks 172 and 191, defendant
knew that there were insufficient funds in Cornerstone's account to cover the checks.
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, [an appellate court]
must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the
evidence, or if [the appellate court] otherwise reach[es] a definite andfirmconviction that
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a mistake has been made." American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, f 4, 12 P.3d
108 (citing Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, J 5,975 P.2d 501) (quotations
omitted). In other words, an appellate court must affirm if there is sufficient competent
evidence as to each element of the charge to enable the trier of fact to determine, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d
278,282 (Utah App. 1998).
Here, the evidence clearly reveals defendant's knowledge that checks 172 and 191
would not be honored by the bank upon issuance. In December, two months prior to
issuing checks 172 and 191, defendant became aware of Cornerstone's financial
difficulties. See R. 184:130-44,166. In February, defendant met with his employees to
explain Cornerstone'sfinancialdifficulties. SeeR. 184:62. At trial, defendant admitted
that he received and reviewed the bank statements containing the account's daily ending
balance. See R. 150-51. The bank statements indicated that twenty-seven checks failed
to clear Cornerstone's account during December 2000, twenty-six during January 2001,
and forty-eight checks during February 2001. R. 184:87-88; State's Exhibits 1,2, and 3.
Defendant also admitted that he placed daily calls to the bank from December through
February to review the account balance. See R. 184:150-52. Thus, the evidence shows
that defendant was plainly aware of the low account balances (S28.56 on 8 February 2001
and $998.75 on 23 February 2001) prior to his issuing Julie's February paychecks. See
id.
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Defendant's request that Julie not immediately cash check 172 also supports the
fact that defendant knew that the paycheck had no value at the time of issuance. See R.
184:58, 61-62. Moreover, because Julie and her credit union had previously brought the
matter to defendant's attention, at the time defendant issued Julie's second paycheck
(check 191) defendant had full knowledge that check 172 was still outstanding and had
not yet cleared Cornerstone's account. See R. 184:36-38, 85, 164; State's Exhibit 4. In
fact, at trial defendant admitted that according to the ending balances listed on the
February bank statement, neither check 172 nor check 191 would have cleared
Cornerstone's checking account on any day during February. R. 184:168-69.
In addition to those facts, the surrounding circumstances also support defendant's
conviction. See State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985) ("[IJntent to prove a
crime 'may be inferredfromthe actions of the defendant orfromsurrounding
circumstances.'") (citation omitted). Specifically, defendant gave no indication that he or
the bank had made some kind of computation error, or that he had any arrangement for an
extension of credit on Cornerstone's checking account which he intended to use. See R.
184.

Even though defendant made a deposit of $2,699.95 on 26 February 2001, that

same day he immediately made several withdrawals amounting to $1,910, leaving a
balance of only $789.95—an amount insufficient to cover check 191 in the amount of
$1,106.21. See R. 184:94-95; State's Exhibit 3. Thus, the evidence clearly shows that
defendant did not intend that deposit to cover Julie's check. See R. 184:86-87, 97-98,
153-54.
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In any event, on appeal defendant concedes that he wrote too many checks and that
he knew some of those checks would not be paid. See Br. of Aplt. at 23. It was for that
reason that defendant warned his employees not to cash their checks immediately. See R.
184:58, 61-62. Although defendant may have believed that the funds would eventually
be sufficient to cover Julie's paychecks, he knew that the funds were insufficient at the
time he issued the checks. Accordingly, where the clear weight of the evidence supports
trial court's judgment, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. See
Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, f 4.
POINT III
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT UTAH'S BAD
CHECK STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Defendant next claims that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) is unconstitutional. See
Br. of Aplt. at 23-26, 31-32, 36-37. Defendant's constitutional challenge is essentially
threefold: (1) in Point I subsection D and Point III subsection C of his brief, defendant
claims that section 76-6-505(1) violates Art. I § 16 of the Utah Constitution's prohibition
against imprisonment for debt, see Br. of Aplt. at 23-25, 36-37; (2) in Point II subsection
C of his brief, defendant claims that section 76-6-505(1) is void for vagueness, see Br. of
Aplt. at 31-32; and (3) in Point III subsection D of his brief, defendant claims that in
general section 76-6-505 violates his due processrightsbecause it punishes him
individually for acting in "a representative capacity," see Br. of Aplt. at 37. Defendant's
claims lack merit.
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"'In determining constitutionality, statutes are presumed to be constitutional until
the contrary is clearly shown." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994)
(quoting In re Estate ofBaer, 562 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977)). Accordingly, "'[ejvery
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor
of constitutionality.5" Id. See also Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah
1983) (holding that statutes "are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and that
they should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which
they can be found to come within the constitutionalframework [sic]") (quotations
omitted). "Those challenging the constitutionality of a statute bear the burden of
demonstrating its unconstitutionality." State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, f 21,975 P.2d
489.
A.

Where the legislative purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) is to prevent
the circulation of worthless commercial paper, defendant fails to show that
the statute violates Utah's constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for
debt.
In both Point I subsection D and Point III subsection C of his brief, defendant

claims that section 76-6-505(1) violates art. I, § 16 of the Utah Constitution. See Br. of
Aplt. at 23-25, 36-37. That article states "[t]here shall be no imprisonment for debt
except in cases of absconding debtors " Utah Const, art. I, § 16. Essentially, defendant
claims that section 76-6-505(1) unconstitutionally imposes punishment for the collection
of a debt. See Br. of Aplt. at 23-25, 36-37. Defendant's claim is frivolous.
Here, defendant was prosecuted not for being in debt, but for issuing bad checks.
Had he been in debt and not issued any bad checks, he would not have been prosecuted.
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In Commonwealth v. Mutnik, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered this
issue. 406 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1979). Like the instant case, Mutnik involved a constitutional
challenge to Pennsylvania's bad check statute, Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4105 (2000), under a
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibiting imprisonment for debt. Id. at 519.
Mutnik, a corporate officer, knowingly issued a bad check on behalf of his company for
the payment of an existing past-due account. Id. at 517. There, the court held that
"[n]either case law nor the language of the constitutional provision precludes the
imprisonment of one who knowingly passes a bad check." Id. at 519. Rather, the court
declared that Mutnik was being punished for intentionally disrupting the flow of and
undermining the soundness of commercial paper in Pennsylvania. Id.
. . . In defining the crime as a passing of a bad check knowing that it would
be dishonored, regardless of consideration, the legislature did not evolve or
proclaim indebtedness as a crime, but rather proclaimed it a crime for
anyone to issue a bad check regardless of whether present consideration
flows. The purpose of this statute is not to imprison debtors but to protect
against impairment of commercial transactions. Most business today is
conducted by the use of checks and, as such, checks have assumed virtually
the same value as governmental currency. As such, the legislature has
declared it a crime for anyone to impugn or impair such a document
regardless of the nature of the transaction in which it is passed. This we
believe to be within the parameters of the police power of the legislature
and we find no impairment to the constitutionality of such act.
Id. (citation and quotations omitted). On those grounds, the Mutnik court declared that
Pennsylvania's bad check statute was constitutional. Id.
Pennsylvania's bad check statute is extremely similar to section 76-6-505(1) in
providing that "[a] person commits an offense if he issues or passes a check or similar
sight order for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee."
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Compare Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4105 (2000) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (1999). Like
the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Utah Constitution does not prohibit imprisonment of
one who knowingly issues a bad check. See Utah Const, art. I, § 16. Moreover, as shown
in Point I subsection A above, the plain language of section 76-6-505(1) reveals that the
Legislature's purpose for enacting the statute is the same as that purpose noted in Mutnik.
Accordingly, where section 76-6-505(1) was enacted to prevent the perversion of the flow
of commercial paper and not for use as a collection tool, defendant's challenge to the
constitutionality of the statute fails.
B.

Given the clarity of the requisite criminal conduct under Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-505(1) and the presumption of constitutionality, defendant fails to show
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague.
Claiming that section 76-6-505(1) is void for vagueness, in Point II subsection C

of his brief defendant argues that the statute creates "an unexpected dichotomy between
bad checks written to pay for goods and bad checks written to pay for services." Br. of
Aplt. at 31-32. Specifically, defendant claims that the language of section 76-6-505(1)
does not provide notice that one may not be prosecuted for paying a pre-existing debt for
goods obtained, and will be prosecuted for paying a pre-existing debt for services
rendered. See id. This claim is frivolous.
"The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an
'offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement.'" State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah App. 1991) (citing
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Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). "More important than actual notice is
'the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement.'" Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, "4[i]t is a basic principle of due
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly
defined.'" Id. (citing Groyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108 (1972)). However,
'"in determining constitutionality, statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the
contrary is clearly shown.'" Ohms, 881 P.2d at 847 (citation omitted).
Defendant's claim fails because section 76-6-505(1) clearly proscribes passing a
bad check "for the purpose of... paying for any . . . wages [.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6505(1) (1999). Defendant fails to explain how any reasonable person could fail to
understand what this language forbids. No language in the statute limits its reach to bad
checks issued to pay for services not yet performed on the date of issuance. See id.
Therefore, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption against unconstitutionality
and show that section 76-6-505(1) is unconstitutionally vague. See Ohms, 881 P.2d at
847.
C.

Because Utah law holds a corporate officer responsible for his criminal acts
taken on behalf of his company, defendant fails to show that Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-505 violates his due process rights.
Finally, in Point III subsection D of his brief, defendant claims that in general

section 76-6-505 violates his due process rights because it punishes him for Cornerstone's
actions. See Br. of Aplt. at 37. Essentially, defendant argues that as a corporate officer of
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Cornerstone, he cannot be held liable for the corporation's bad acts. See id. Defendant's
claim is both inadequately briefed and fiajrolous.
(1)

Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed.

Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that "[t]he argument shall
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ..
. with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App.
P. 24(a)(9). In the instant case, defendant whole argument consists of little more than a
third of a page. See Br. of Aplt. at 37. Defendant cites no cases, no constitutional
provisions, and offers no analysis. See id. Given defendant's complete failure to brief
this issue, this Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim. See State v. Jaeger,
1999 UT 1,131,973 P.2d 404 (refusing to address an inadequately briefed constitutional
argument).
(2)

Utah law clearly states that defendant is responsible for his criminal
conduct committed in Cornerstone's name.

Notwithstanding defendant's failure to adequately brief his claim, defendant's
claim fails under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-205 states that "[a] person is
criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be
performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or association to the same extent
as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2205 (1999). Moreover, the term "person" as found in section 76-6-505 is defined under
the criminal code as either "an individual [or] public or private corporation[.]" Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-601 (1999). Accordingly, under Utah law, as the acting president of
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Cornerstone, and the only individual authorized to sign checks on Cornerstone's behalf,
defendant is criminally liable for issuing bad paychecks to Julie, knowing that there were
insufficient funds in Cornerstone's account to cover those checks. See id.; Utah Code
Ann. § 76-2-205 (1999); R. 184:15-16, 150, 162.
POINT IV
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING HIM TO USE HIS
DISCLOSURE TO THE VICTIM AS A DEFENSE, IS
BOTH INADEQUATELY BRIEFED AND FLAWED
In Point IV of his brief, Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not allowing
him to present his disclosure to Julie that the checks may not clear, as a defense. See Br.
of Aplt at 37-38. Defendant's claim is both inadequately briefed and fundamentally
flawed.
A.

Defendant fails to adequately brief his claim.
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are

not adequately briefed." State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924,926 (Utah App. 1998). See Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ('The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the
appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on."). Here, defendant's argument is cursory at best and
fails to offer any analysis or support for his claims. See Br. of Aplt. at 37-38. Defendant
superficially treats his claim in only one-half page of text. See id. Cf. State v. Lucero,
2002 UT App 135, fj 12-15, 47 P.3d 107 (finding a single-issue argument consisting of
only six pages to be inadequately briefed). Further, the argument includes only two cases
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and two references to Am. Jur. 2d, all of which are summarily cited and wholly
unexplained. See Br. of Aplt. at 37-38. Defendant provides no analysis or application of
the legal principles contained in those cases to the present facts. See id.; see also State v.
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that
authority."). In essence, defendant impermissibly treats this Court as '"a depository in
which [he] dump[s] the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d
439,450 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). Accordingly, where defendant's claim is
inadequately briefed, it need not be addressed by this Court. See Parra, 972 P.2d at 926.
B.

Defendant's defense is flawed in that it is not absolute.
Irrespective of defendant's failure to brief his claim, defendant's defense also fails

because it is not absolute. Defendant claims that at the time he issued the paychecks to
Julie, he disclosed the "potential problems" with the checks. Br. of Aplt. at 38. However,
that issue was contested at trial. The record indicates that Julie acknowledged that
defendant had asked her not to cash check 172 and instructed her to deposit it instead, but
she could not recall receiving any instructions when check 191 was issued. See R.
184:58, 60-62. The record further indicates that the trial court found Julie to be the more
credible witness. See R. 184:205; see also State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah
App. 1989) (stating that because '"the truth is rarely pure and never simple,"' the trial
judge is in the best position to sift witness credibility and the accuracy of conflicting
evidence.") (citations omitted); State v. Pierce, 111 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1986) (stating
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that "[t]he fact finder isfreeto weigh the conflicting evidence presented and to draw its
own conclusions"). Thus, even if the trial court were to find that defendant's claim was
valid with regard to check 172, he could still have been convicted for issuing check 191.
Cf. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 731-32 (Utah 1984). Accordingly, where defendant's
defense does not apply to both paychecks, it fails.
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that his defense is incomplete, defendant failed
to pay check 172 even after Julie followed his instructions. See R. 184:34-36. Therefore,
defendant's "disclosure defense" is also invalid against check 172.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction for issuing a bad check.
Dated this jfl^day of January, 2003.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
Utah Attorney General

S-£&c^~*-~JEFFREY T. COLEMERE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
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76-6-503. Iaauing a bad check or draft — Presumption.
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money; property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wages, salary; labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for
which payment ia reftised by tha drawee ia presumed to know the check or
draft would not bo paid if ha had no account with tha drawee at the time of
issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for tha payment of
money, for tha purpoee of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any
services, wagee, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which chads or draft is
legally reftised by the drawee, ia guilty of iaauing a bad check or draft if he fails
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or
draft's nonpayment
(3) An offenee of iaauing a bad check or draft shall be punished aa follows:
(a) If tha check or draft or striae of checks or drafts made or drawn in
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounta to a sum that
ia leee than $300, the ofihnae ia a class B misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or diecka or drafta made or drawn in this sU
within a period not streeding six months amounta to a sum that ia or
exceeds $300 but ia leee than $1,000, the offtnee ia a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Ifthedieckordraftor<&ecksordraftemadeordrawn
within a period not streeding six moothe amounta to a sum that ia or
exceeds $ 1,000 but ia leee than $5,000, tha offenee ia a felony of the third
degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this sUte
within a period not streeding six moothe amounta to a sum that ia or
exceoda $6,000, tha oAoee ia a second degree felony.

76-2-204. Criminal responsibility of corporation or association.
A corporation or association is guilty of an offense when:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to
discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations or associations by law; or
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by
the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the
scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation or association.

76-2-103. Definitions.
A person engages in conduct:
(1) Intentionally; or with intent or willftdly with respect to thenatureof
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantia], and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviationfromthe
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under ail the
circumstances as viewedfromthe actor's standpoint.
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross
deviationfromthe standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise
in all the circumstances as viewedfromthe actor's standpoint.

76.1-601. Definitions.
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title:
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech.
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in
a criminal action.
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of
physical condition.
(4) "Conduct19 means an act or omission.
(5) "Dangerous weapon* means:
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and:
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death
or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other
manner that he is in control of such an item.
(6) "Offense19 means a violation of any penal statute of this state.
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act
and the actor is capable of acting.
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise
dominion or control over tangible property.
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of
death.
(11) "Substantial bodily iiyury" means bodily injury, not amounting to
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain,
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function
of any bodily member or organ.
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting,
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being
preserved.

76-1-106. Strict construction rule not applicable.
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104.

Rule 24. Briefsfa) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under
appropriate headings and in the order indicated:
(DA complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover.
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page
references.
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to
the pages of the brief where they are cited.
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue:
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial
court; or
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in
the trial court
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and. regulations
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the
provision shall be setforthin an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11)
of this rule.
(7) A statement of the cam. The statement shall first indicate briefly the
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issuee presented for review shall
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this
rule.
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made
in the body of the brief! It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under
which the argument is arranged.
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of
the appellant with respect to the issuee presented, including the grounds for
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the
authorities, statute*, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a
factfindingmustfirstmarshal all record evidence that supports the challenged
finding.
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum
shall contain a copy of:

(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central
importance cited in the brief bvit not reproduced verbatim in the brief;
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions,findingsof
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction.
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not
include:
( D a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied
with the statement of the appellant; or
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum
of the appellant The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant.
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the .
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee mayfilea brief in
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the crossappeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in
the opposing brief The content of the reply brief shall conform to the
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further
briefii may befiledexcept with leave of the appellate court
(d) References in briefii to partite. Counsel will be expected in their briefii
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such
designations as "appellant* and "appellee.* It promotee clarity to use the
designations used in the lower wart or in the agency proceedings,
or the actual
namee of partiee, or deecripttve terms such as "the employee,9 "the injured
person," "die taxpayer/ etc
(e) Refkrtncee in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottomrightcorner and each separately
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy,
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was
identified* offered* and received or rejected.
(0 Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefii shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum
containing statutee, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of
this rule sets forth the length of briefs.

(g) Briefs in cases involving cross*appeals. If a cross-appeal isfiled,the party
firstfilinga notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross*
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may thenfilea second brief, not
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown.
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellant* or appellees. In cases
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs.
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court An original letter
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the
citations pertain; but die letter shall without argument state the reasons for
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing
and shall be similarly limited.
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise,
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending
lawyer.
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and
shall comply with Rule 27.
(Amended effective October 1,1992; July 1,1994; April 1,1995; April 1,1998;
November 1,1999.)
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Art. I, § 1

ARTICLE I
DECLARATION OP
RIGHTS
Section
1. (Inherent and inalionabla rights.]
2. (All political powtr inharont in tha paopla.]
3. [Utah inseparable from tha Union.)
4. (Raligioui Libarty — No proparty qualification to vota or hold offica.J
5. [Habaaa corpue.)
6. [Right to baar anna.]
7. [Dua proceee of law.]
8. [Offanssa bailable.]
9. [Exceeaive bail and finaa — Crual puniahmente.)
10. [Trial by jury]
11. [Courta open — Redrea* of ixyuriee.)
12. [Righta or accusad parsona.]
13. [Proascutioa by intonation or indictment
— Grand jury.]
14. [Unraaaooabie aeaithesforbidden— Iaae»
anca of warrant]

Section
15. [Frtadom of ipooch and of tha prtao — Libal.]
16. [No imprisonmant for dabt — Exception.]
17. [Election! to ba fraa — Soldiers voting.]
18. [Attainder—E* postfocfcolawe — Impairing contracts.]
19. [Treaaon defined — Proof]
20. [Military subordinate to tha civil power.]
21. (Slavery forbidden.]
22. (Private property for public use.]
23. [Irrevocable franchiaaa forbidden.)
24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
25. [Righta retained by paopla.]
26. [Proviaiooe mandatory and prohibitory.]
27. (Fundamental rights.]

Sec* 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.]
There shell be no imprisonment for debt except in caeee of absconding
debtors.
HMovyi Co*ot 1661
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1

AND THERE ARE TIMES IN OUR LIFE THAT COMING UP WITH $2,000 CAN

2

BE QUITE DIFFICULT, BUT IT'S NOT IMPOSSIBLE.

3

IMPOSSIBLE IN OUR SOCIETY, IN OUR CULTURE FOR AN EDUCATED MAN

4

WITH DILIGENT EFFORT TO LOCATE, BORROW —

5

SUGGEST STEALING ~

6

LEGITIMATELY. AND IT WAS RECKLESS FOR HIM TO ALLOW THE CHECKS

7

AND THEN NOT BE MORE DILIGENT TO GET THEM COVERED.

8
9

IT'S NOT

I'M NOT GOING TO

BUT BORROW OR OTHERWISE LOCATING FUNDS

TBI COURT: THANK YOU. THOUGH I'VE LISTENED
CAREFULLY TO THE EVIDENCE AS IT CAME IN.

I'VE LISTENED

10

CAREFULLY TO YOUR ARGUMENTS AS YOU PRESENTED THEM.

I'M AWARE

11

OF THE STATUTE AND I'M AWARE OF THE COURT'S REVIEWING PRIOR

12

TO TODAY'S TRIAL.

13

I THINK I'M PROBABLY IN AS GOOD A POSITION RIGHT NOW AS I

14

WILL BE AT ANY TIME TO MAKE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING

15

THE EVIDENCE THAT I HAVE RECEIVED.

16

AS IT WILL EVER BE.

17

IT'S FRESH IN MY MIND NOW

MY BEST VIEW OF THIS, FOLKS, IS THAT, FIRST OF ALL, I

18

THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY AS COUNSEL'S ARGUED THAT MR. HOPKINS

19

IS A VERY INTELLIGENT MAN, VERY HIGHLY EDUCATED, IS A VERY

20

EXPERIENCED BUSINESSMAN BASED ON HIS TESTIMONY. AND MY BEST

21

VIEW IS THAT AS PRESIDENT OF THIS CORPORATION HE WAS

22

RESPONSIBLE —

23

PASSING OF THESE PAYROLL CHECKS.

24
25

THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ISSUANCE OR

NOW, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND UNDER THE LAW
THAT'S SET OUT IN 76-2-205, I FIND THAT IN THAT CAPACITY HE

205
WAS THE PERSON WHO ISSUED OR PASSED EACH OF THESE CHECKS, HAD
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE OR PASS THEM.

AND AS THE AGENT OF THE

CORPORATION DID IT, EVEN WITH REGARD TO THAT CHECK THAT MAY BE
HIS DAUGHTER-IN-LAW'S SIGNATURE AS HE'S TESTIFIED, THAT
ULTIMATELY IT WAS HE WHO ISSUED AND PASSED THAT CHECK FOR
PAYROLL THAT WAS HONESTLY DUE AND OWING IN AN AMOUNT THAT WAS
THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS AFTER.
THE PURPOSE OF EACH OF THE CHECKS AT ISSUE WAS A PURPOSE
SET OUT IN 76-505-1 AND 2; THAT IS, PAYING FOR WAGES, SALARY,
LABOR.

AND WITH REGARD TO SUBSECTION 2, THE ISSUE IS WHETHER

HE KNEW IT WOULD NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE.

AND AS I REVIEW

STATE'S EXHIBITS 1, 2, AND 3, THE BANK STATEMENTS THAT SHOW
NUMEROUS BOUNCED CHECKS IN DECEMBER, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, AS
I REVIEW THE TESTIMONY THAT —

THAT NUMEROUS EMPLOYEES WERE

TOLD THAT, YOU KNOW, DON'T TRY TO CASH THIS.

JUST DEPOSIT IT.

WE'RE CONFIDENT IT WILL PASS. THAT SHOWED KNOWLEDGE THAT
THERE WAS A PROBLEM.

AND I THINK IT'S SUFFICIENT TO SHOW

KNOWLEDGE THAT ANY GIVEN CHECK MAY NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE.
THERE SEEMED TO BE A SUGGESTION THAT THE CRIME WAS
COMMITTED BY THE EMPLOYEES FOR NOT FOLLOWING STRICTLY THE
DIRECTIONS OF DEPOSITING THEM RATHER THAN TRYING TO CASH THEM
OR WAITING SOME TIME BEFORE THEY DEPOSIT THEM.

AND I GUESS I

JUST DON'T SEE IT THAT WAY.
IT'S CLEAR WITH REGARD TO THESE TWO CHECKS, THEY WERE
REFUSED BY THE DRAWEE AND THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS KNOWING.

^uo

1

IT WAS ALSO EXTREMELY RECKLESS WITH REGARD TO THE STATE OF THE'

2

BUSINESS AS TESTIFIED TO DURING THE TIME AT ISSUE, FEBRUARY OF

3

2001.

4

76-6-505 HAVE BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

5

WITH REGARD TO 2, WE'VE ALREADY COVERED SOME OF THE

AND I FIND THAT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 1 OF

6

ELEMENTS, AND WE DROP DOWN TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER HE LATER

7

RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN MADE GOOD.

8

AND I DO FIND THAT WITH REGARD TO EACH OF THESE TWO CHECKS HE

9

HAD RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE CHECK'S NONPAYMENT.

WITH

10

REGARD TO THE EARLIER CHECK, NOTICE CAME FROM A LETTER BY

11

AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION.

12

CHECKS, THERE WAS NOTICE PROVIDED BY THE EMPLOYEE, MISS

13

VANISI, THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN PAID.

14

TESTIMONY WITH REGARD TO THAT, AND MAKE IT FINDINGS OF THE

15

COURT.

16

WITH REGARD TO BOTH OF THE

AND I ACCEPT YOUR

HAVING THAT NOTICE, HE KNOWINGLY AND RECKLESSLY FAILED TO

17

MAKE GOOD FOR PAYMENT WITHIN THE 14 DAYS ALLOWED UNDER THE

18

STATUTE.

19

BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

AND I FIND ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 2 HAVE

20

BASED ON THOSE FINDINGS AND IN LIGHT OF THE AMENDED

21

INFORMATION THAT IS FILED BY THE STATE, I DO FIND THAT THERE

22

HAS BEEN A SINGLE VIOLATION OF 76-6-505 AND WILL ENTER A

23

JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION TO A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY BASED ON THAT.

24

I WILL SET SENTENCING IN THE MATTER —

LET'S SEE.

25

MR. DRAKE, HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CALENDAR WITH YOU?

